Applied Game Theory Case Study

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Applied Game Theory Project Mohit Batham (11426) In the project, I have looked into 3 different problems related to Bollywood Industry. The games that I have solved are: Clash of Bollywood movies on Big Weekends Signaling Game in Bollywood: Producers and Viewers Location Problem with Directional Constraints: An Application to Movie Shows Clash of Bollywood movies on Big Weekends Introduction Entertainment has become a very important part of our life. One source of entertainment is Cinema, also called Bollywood in India. The Bollywood industry attracts many people around the country for making it big e.g. Actor, Director etc. Producers make large bets on movies. Bollywood movies are released over the year, with few major…show more content…
In this problem if there is only one vendor he will get all the customer no matter where he stands, so to minimize the mean distance travelled by the customers he stands in the middle. Given two vendors, both still choose to stay in the middle. While for three vendors there is no set of location that is an equilibrium. Our problem seems to be same as the location problem. But in our case people can only watch movie that begin after they arrive at the mall. As the ice cream vendor only care about how far his customers has to walk not in which direction. So, our problem adds a directional constraint and has significant impact on the existence and nature of equilibrium. Now we assume that movie choose their show timing so as to maximize their audience size. Another assumption that people watch the first show that starts after they arrive in the mall and the time at which the audience arrive at mall is continuously distributed on an interval [0, T]. If the audience is given k choices that are shown simultaneously, each show would capture 1/k of the total audience. Thus a movie’s profit depends not only on its timing but also its competitor’s…show more content…
This structure means that half of the viewers have a preference for movie x (c < 0) and half for movie y (c > 0). This symmetric example on preferences preserves the feature that for equal location choices, movie shows share equally the audience. An individual chooses to view movie x if c < y - x. The viewer has preferences over two characteristics: the moment emission begins (the sooner the better) and the movie show. The tradeoff between these two characteristics has been stated. Total viewers of each movie are: Dx = ∫_0^x▒∫_c1^((y-x))▒〖1 dc dz〗 = (y - x - c1) x (3) Dy = ∫_0^y▒∫_((y-x))^c2▒〖1 dc dz〗 = (c2 - y + x) y (4) Viewers can wait for a later show if they arrive earlier than the start of both movie shows. However, if they arrive after the ﬁrst show has started, then they can only see the other movie show. There are two pure-strategies equilibrium characterized by (x = (1 – c1)/2, y = 1) Or (b) (x = 1, y = (1 + c2)/2) (5) Straightforward resolution of ﬁrst-order conditions of each movie’s problem. Note that the boundary condition of emission time not higher than one is active in equilibrium for one of the