The Luzon Campaign

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The Luzon Campaign represented a vital component in the first step of the strategic plan to defeat Japan: controlling the northern portion of the South China Sea. The Allies determined that ownership of Luzon, Formosa (Taiwan), and a portion of the South China Coast were crucial to achieving air and naval in the region. Once these possessions came under Allied control, planners predicted they would have the ability to sever the communication and supply lines between the Japanese homeland and southern forces, dividing the Japanese military in two. Allied battle plans placed the priority on Luzon, which would host naval and air bases from which to launch attacks on the remaining objectives. The Luzon Campaign presented a scenario in which, for…show more content…
The planning subsection was responsible for producing strength, movement patterns, and disposition estimates as well as determining the location of the enemy’s fixed installations and defenses. The planning subsection’s products are the primary resources commanders use to plan offensives, landing sites, and exfiltration routes, making their work a key asset in the conduct of a campaign. Throughout the Leyte Campaign, the planning staff of the Sixth Army had the sole mission of preparing and gathering intelligence for the Luzon Campaign. Combat intelligence is primarily responsible for the interpretation of data collected to support ongoing operations, such as aerial reconnaissance images, human intelligence from friendly guerillas and civilians, and intercepted messages. This section of the intelligence is where adaptations to methods of data collection and interpretation come to fruition. While not involved with the pre-invasion planning of a battle or campaign, the combat intelligence section was the first to know of any significant changes in the enemy’s plans that could bring unforeseen challenges, and helped informed adjustments to friendly…show more content…
An example of the critical role the planning subsection served in the campaign, this part of the island was so lightly defended because the Japanese anticipated the United States invasion to take place at either Batangas Bay or Basugbu Bay, both of which sit to the south of Japanese defensive positions. For this reason, they chose to construct defenses facing the south and virtually ignored any possibility of an “impossible” invasion from the Lingayen Gulf. While the Japanese were correct in determining that a landing at Lingayen Gulf would be difficult for the United States forces, careful American planning mitigated nearly major risks and made the Gulf an ideal location that bolstered numerous advantages to an invading force. An account of Edwin Jeffers, a battalion intelligence officer during the invasion, recalls how efficiently the Allied troops on the offensive advanced inland. He credited the speedy and smoothly executed operation to the plethora of aerial surveillance and terrain imagery made available all the way down to the company level. Dissemination to this level was rare for the time, but enabled the company commanders to achieve a degree of preparedness that would shock Japanese
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