2.1.2.3. Thing-Oriented Relevance
The Vaisheshika’s atomic theory discussed above reminds us of the object-oriented ontologist Ian Bogost’s view in relation to flat ontology: “all things equally exist, yet they do not exist equally” (11). That is, flat ontology, as defined by Bogost, affirms that “things can be many and various, specific and concrete, while their being remains identical” (12). The claim of object-oriented ontology that all things are equal becomes relevant to the theory of atomism in the sense that all things contain the atoms of the earth, water, fire and air. At the same time, as Graham Harman, a leading object-oriented philosopher, argues, the atomic theory reduces the fundamental reality of all things to the four great…show more content… Rudiments of realism are perceivable in the Sāṃkhya school, founded by the sage Kapila. The term, Sāṃkhya, is derived the Sanskrit word, samkhya, which means “number”. Sāṃkhya also means “perfect knowledge”. In this sense, it is a system of perfect knowledge. This school attempts to impart knowledge of reality by specifying the number and nature of the ultimate constituents of the universe. The Sāṃkhya has a realist approach to things. It rejects the belief of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Jainism that atoms are the ultimate constituents of the physical world. It argues that atoms of matter cannot be the cause of subtle and fine objects like mind and intellect, and therefore, there should be some finest and subtlest matter, which underlies all physical existence. The Sāṃkhya calls such matter “Prakriti”. In fact, it believes in two ultimate realities namely Prakriti (matter) and Purusha (self/spirit), and affirms that both are equally real and eternal (“Samkhya”…show more content… Its claim that matter and spirit are equally real is in perfect line with flat ontology of things which asserts “that all objects are equal in so far as they are objects” (Gabriel n.p.). In this way, the Sāṃkhya’s assertion of equality of matter and spirit is in opposition to the Cartesian dualism of body and soul which, as noted by M. John Britto, privileges human being over other entities because of the former’s (human) possession of soul (721). Object-oriented ontology rejects the Cartesian dualism on account of privileging humans over nonhuman things. However, the Sāṃkhya’s views on Satkāryavāda, particularly on Prakriti-pariṇāmavāda, reveal that the fundamental matter of all material things in the world is Prakriti, and the individual material things are merely different forms of the same matter, Prakriti. Thus, the Sāṃkhya’s Prakriti-pariṇāmavāda undermines the individual things, by reducing their fundamental existence to the Moola-Prakriti (Primordial