What is ‘Metaphysics of Morals’? For thirty years, Kant intended to entitle his system of ethics ‘Metaphysics of Morals.’ In discussing the Metaphysics of Morals, I will discuss Allan Wood’s article in Mark Timmons’s volume Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays; Woods presents a thoughtful interpretation that might be a clue for our discussion of emptiness charge. By examining each of the two major doctrines of Metaphysics of Morals, that is, principle of right and the class of juridical
Kant to focus less on theoretical obscurity and more upon practical issues and leads to the notion of good will which Kant explains at the outset of Section I in Groundwork: It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Gr. 4:393) Good will includes several features: it is neither merely designed to make us happy, nor does it rely on the consequences of an act or unconditional good. While
are dual sense of empty in Hegel’s empty charge. The first sense of ‘empty’ is equivalent to have both for and content. The second sense of ‘empty’ is the ‘determining’. Systematic Interpretation of Emptiness Charge views as Hegel’s empty charge a non-self-standing philosophical problem, irrespective of its historical context or systematic place in Hegel’s theory. The will must be acting on a law and cannot be acting merely randomly. The only law follows a law like, e.g. universalizable maxim. Law-giving