Putnam discusses two philosophical perspectives, one that has God’s Eye point of view – called externalist – and the other what can be taken as an internalist perspective. Kant – as opposed to this Berkeleyan view – is regarded by Putnam as the first internalist. (Putnam p. 60) Interestingly, internalism Putnam seems to endorse can be looked upon as anti-realism, a sort of idealism, according to which only the various perspectives of actual persons that matter. (Putnam pp. 49-51) Putnam although based on semantic externalism argues that the though experiment of being a brain in a vat is self-refuting – maybe it includes the Berkeleyan version of idealism according to which our private perceptions are coordinated by God –, but he might be taken…show more content… xi.) Putnam even seems to think that “objects do not exist independently of conceptual schemes”, and the human minds or perceivers “cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description.” (Putnam p. 52) If the objects and the signs referring to them are equally mental or internal in Putnam’s sense than it is possible only in the scheme of description to say what matches what. He asserts that the reference is brought about after the discourse about an object and its referent, rather than before that. As Putnam understands reference being external to our mind, he claims that we cannot determinately refer to mind-independent…show more content… Hegel’s main contention went beyond Kant’s epistemological standpoint, claiming that we can have knowledge of the ultimate reality (as a spiritual realm). But the ultimate spirituality of reality is essentially universal, does not belong to the individual souls and their experiences, but originating from an absolute mind or soul that constitute everything, from history to the physical things. This godlike spirit becomes manifest through the finite minds and material things embodying itself in particular things as well as in the course of history. (Redding 2.2.) For Hegel reason governs the history, which basically means that everything has an aim or purpose it strives for, on the ultimate level of analysis to realize or manifest the absolute spirit. He argues that the world is not rational due to an imposition made by the subjective minds which inevitably yields to a world lurking, so to speak, behind our experience unknown to us – as in Kant we can read –, but because some sort of rationality or reason inheres in the physical world or the things themselves and they have a formal-final cause, a rational aim to achieve. The world – even the world we experience – is not the construction or the content of some minds. That’s why his view properly called objective idealism as opposed to subjective idealism (maintaining that neither the