Nazi Soviet Non-Aggression Pact Analysis

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The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was a strategic agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union. On August 14, 1939, Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov met with the Nazi foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop in Moscow to discuss and arrange this pact. Nine days later the Nazi Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed. Briefly, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact stated that both countries would not attack one another neither individually or in collaboration with other powers and that one country does not have to support the other if attack by a third power. This treaty was to last 10 years and if neither party formally denounce the pact it shall automatically be extended for another five years. (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/230972/German-Soviet-Nonaggression-Pact…show more content…
However during the second half of Autumn temperatures began to drop and the rain began to set in during mid October. The rain caused roads and surrounding land to be turned to mud, one of the largest obstacles during a war of movement and lasted for about a month. However though the muddy season was fairly short it had large effects upon the German army even in one case stopping an entire army from proceeding forward. Dirt roads were commonly impassable and supply trucks broke through the gravel-topped roads leaving the German armies using horse and cart to carry supplies from Germany and through Russia. The loss of German tanks and other motorised equipment was extremely high during the Autumn of 1941, with average of 1 tank surviving out of every ten. For example the second Panzer group lost 60% of it’s tanks by getting bogged down in the mud. This was a serious loss as no replacements were received. (http://www.allworldwars.com/Effects-of-Climate-on-Combat-in-European-Russia.html#III) The following quote, from the webiste All World Wars, depicts the advantage the Russian soldiers had during the muddy season. “The defender has time to organize his position well in advance of the muddy season. He can establish communications that enable him to shift reserves to threatened sectors. … Defending infantry can fight from dry, well-concealed positions, while attacking infantry offer a prime target as it clumsily trudges through knee-deep mud.” () The Russian, though with more experience in this area, were not immune to the muddy season. However Russia a greater understanding about the effects the mud would have on their army and therefore decided that no large scale operations were to be launched or continued during the muddy season. Once the muddy season ends in Russia a period of clear weather follows, usually

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