What is ‘Metaphysics of Morals’? For thirty years, Kant intended to entitle his system of ethics ‘Metaphysics of Morals.’ In discussing the Metaphysics of Morals, I will discuss Allan Wood’s article in Mark Timmons’s volume Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays; Woods presents a thoughtful interpretation that might be a clue for our discussion of emptiness charge. By examining each of the two major doctrines of Metaphysics of Morals, that is, principle of right and the class of juridical
ultimate aim is to demonstrate how metaphysics could be possible; in doing this, he constructs his transcendental philosophy. It seems Kant does not want to go further which has led critics to argue that Kant gave an unclear exposition here and in preceding writings, thereby muddling the doctrine of practical and transcendental freedom. Likewise, many commentators, most notably Allison and Henrich, argue that while Kant attempts to provide a direct interpretation of morality in the First Critique, he fails
Kant to focus less on theoretical obscurity and more upon practical issues and leads to the notion of good will which Kant explains at the outset of Section I in Groundwork: It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Gr. 4:393) Good will includes several features: it is neither merely designed to make us happy, nor does it rely on the consequences of an act or unconditional good. While