Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent, Gnango, had entered into a joint enterprise, within the provisions of Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, with Bandana Man after they voluntarily met in a public place for a gunfight with the common purpose to shoot and be shot at and by their conduct encouraged each other to that end and where Bandana Man mistakenly shoots a passerby, is he liable for the murder? [NO]
Issue: (2) Whether Gnango, under the doctrine of transferred malice, is liable for murder based on the fact that he had encouraged Bandana Man to repeatedly shoot at him thus allowing for the accidental shooting of the passerby by Bandana Man? [NO]
Issue: (3) Whether the victim rule precluded the conviction of Gnango…show more content… Whether,in the instant case, the defendant was correctly described as a principal or accessory is irrelevant to his guilt
Reasoning: (1) The applicable test is whether Gnango’s agreement to exchange gunfire in a public place with Bandana Man with the common purpose to shoot and be shot at and by their conduct encouraged each other to that end, constituted a joint enterprise between them and therefore criminally liable for murder.
Joint enterprise can arise out of two situations. One such case in where two persons, agree to the commission of an indictable offence, where both are present at the place where the criminal act is to be performed and where one of them commits that act then both will be jointly liable for the crime. As the act is committed pursuant to their joint criminal purpose and both will be equally quilty as one having aided, abetted, counselled or procured the other to commit the…show more content… Pniewska, it cannot be said that Gnango aided and abetted in his own attempted murder as per the victim rule. However, Bandana Man was the intended victim of Gnango. Therefore, the 'victim rule' did not apply in this case and no extension of the common law could make it so.
(4) The applicable test is whether Gnango would be liable for murder as a joint principal by participating by agreement in unlawful violence specifically designed to cause and causing death or serious injury.
To say that Gnango is liable as a joint principal is to prove that he contributed to the actus reus by his own independent act rather than merely aiding or abetting. Gnango had participated with Bandana Man in an agreement to shoot and be shot at with the necessary intent. The participation in such an agreement constitutes joint principal liability and therefore on this basis Gnango would be liable for the murder of Madga