In this paper, I will argue for Peter Carruthers argument for the Identity-Thesis. First, I will examine Carruthers’s views on the Identity-Thesis. Next, I will scrutinize Rene Descartes piece, Meditation. Finally, I will discuss the Certainty objection. In Peter Carruthers’ paper, The Mind Is the Brain, he provides his argument that the Mind and Brain are one and the same. Mind, being a person’s conscience/soul and brain, being the physical brain. Carruthers explains it simply, “… just as a particular cloud is, as a matter of fact, a great many water droplets suspended close together in the atmosphere; and just as a particular flash of lightning is, as a matter of fact, a certain sort of discharge of electrical energy; so a pain or a thought is (is identical with) some state of the brain or central nervous system” (Carruthers, CR pg. 319). In other words, Thoughts are physical events; it can be shown or mapped out…show more content… Descartes states, “I have a clear and distinct idea of myself… as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as… I possess a distinct idea of body… only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I … am entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it” (Descartes IP pg. 334). To paint a picture, Descartes basically saying his body is just a temporary thing. That Descartes “Soul” is really floating somewhere above the body and it attaches itself to a body to do physical things. Carruthers sums up Descartes argument in “The Mind Is the Body” as so, “(1) I may be absolutely certain of my own experiences, when I have them. (2) I cannot have the same degree of certainty about the existence of any physical state, including my own brain state. (C) So (by Leibniz’s Law) my conscious experiences are not in fact identical with brain-states” (Carruthers CR pg. 320). First off, Leibniz’s Law is ‘identical things share identical