Since the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, the correction and removal of racially discriminatory practices has become an issue of the upmost importance in the United States. Although many racist practices have been perpetuated in the modern era, one that I believe to be of particular import is the continued usage of peremptory strikes to remove minorities, particularly African Americans, from juries. Although the 1875 Civil Rights Act extended the right to be on a jury to African Americans, there have been many strategies employed to prevent African Americans, and other minorities, from serving on juries. The peremptory strike is just the most prominent method in recent history. For many, Foster v. Chatman presents a familiar set of circumstances…show more content… During the trial, there were five potential black jurors, all of whom made it into the pool of forty-two qualified jurors. Of those five black potential jurors, one was removed from the pool for cause, but the other four were removed through peremptory strikes. The defense challenged on the ground of Batson v. Kentucky, the landmark case on the issue. The prosecution presented a large number of seemingly race-neutral explanations, and the trial court accepted them. Foster was convicted by an all-White jury and was given the death penalty. New evidence arose in 2006 and after several appeals on the State level the case is now on review before U.S. Supreme Court with the question presented by Foster being, “Did the Georgia courts err in failing to recognize race discrimination under Batson in the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case?…show more content… Kentucky has proved to be a ruling that required clarification and due to it being a compromise between the interests of ending racial discrimination and the preserving the peremptory strike it has been challenged on numerous counts since it was handed down. In Holland v. Illinois (1990) it was established that Batson cannot be utilized to guarantee a “fair cross section” in the actual jury, by preventing the exclusion of particular groups from the venire. In Hernandez v New York (1991) it was stated, “If a prosecutor articulates a basis for a peremptory challenge that results in the disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain race, the trial judge may consider that fact as evidence that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial discrimination.” Powers v. Ohio (1991) established that an individual might make a Batson objection regardless of whether or not the excluded jurors and the defendant share a race. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co (1991) expanded Batson to civil cases in addition to criminal cases, which was major stepping stone in eliminating discrimination. J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994) expanded Batson protections to gender in addition to race . Purkett v. Elem established in the majority that Batson’s purpose is to prevent the prosecution from merely denying that their was racial bias in their selection, “What it means by a "legitimate reason" [for removal from the venire] is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that