discuss Allan Wood’s article in Mark Timmons’s volume Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays; Woods presents a thoughtful interpretation that might be a clue for our discussion of emptiness charge. By examining each of the two major doctrines of Metaphysics of Morals, that is, principle of right and the class of juridical (or coercively enforceable) duties, Woods argues it will help us more clearly understand Kant’s implication. Wood claims, Kant’s admirers, in fact, as well as his
metaphysics could be possible; in doing this, he constructs his transcendental philosophy. It seems Kant does not want to go further which has led critics to argue that Kant gave an unclear exposition here and in preceding writings, thereby muddling the doctrine of practical and transcendental freedom. Likewise, many commentators, most notably Allison and Henrich, argue that while Kant attempts to provide a direct interpretation of morality in the First Critique, he fails. In their view, because Kant
philosophy in the Second Critique and, and so also of the Groundwork, is, in Kant’s view, to ‘seek out’ the foundational principle of a ‘metaphysics of morals,’ which Kant understands as a system of a priori moral principles that apply the CI to human persons in all times and cultures. In this sense, if Kant’s mature writings are labeled empty formalism, his ethics would not offer us any practical guidance. Rather, Kant tests these moral concerns in practice and in doing so we discover that the charge