Dania Simpson PHL 270-C 10/06/2015 Reading Question: Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, pp 34-41 In the second section of Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, he makes the distinction between beings as persons or things. “Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature
he has other choices in accordance with moral law. While he may realize that in accordance with causal law he will ultimately face the effect of his theft, only via a normative determination will he experience practical freedom. In this Critique, Kant’s main purpose is not to draw the reader’s attention to actual moral experience, and the First Critique does not actually explain the moral philosophy. Kant’s ultimate aim is to demonstrate how metaphysics could be possible; in doing this, he constructs
particularities of the moral law, perhaps, given the synthesis of the three formulations in the second section of the Groundwork, Kant might consider it unnecessary to modify CI yet again. By the time of the Second Critique, he engages in a rather careful explication of the moral law in which he does not offer a clear definition of the moral law, since it appears that providing the theoretical ground for the moral law is